This paper evaluates and compares the government reforms of current Roh government and the previous administration based on 7 success factors of a government reform. The Roh administration is doing a better job than the Kim administration in such areas as preparation for a reform, periodical examinations and evaluation, and change management. However, the Roh administration shows relative weaknesses in creating an effective reform-leading organization, providing a balanced reform direction, and in overcoming resistance. This paper also suggests five important features of a successful reform-leading organization: full-time and permanent organization, organization directly under the President, focus on reform, flexibility in organizational management, and a combination of career civil servants and specialists from the non-government sector.
Every administration desires to reform its inherited government. However, it is not easy to accomplish this goal. President Kim Dae-Jung was the first President in Korea that included government reform in his official agenda, linking it with reforms in the corporate sector, financial sector, and labor sector. His successor, President Roh, has also emphasized the importance of the government reform since his inauguration in 2003.
For a reform to be successful, there are some preconditions that should be met. Did President Kim's and Roh's government reform satisfy those conditions? The paper adopts seven criteria in evaluating and comparing the strategies and conditions for government reforms under President Kim and Roh. The criteria are revised version of 8 steps of transformation presented by Kotter (1996) . 2 The major problem of President Roh's government reform suggested in this paper is a lack of competent and motivated organization that leads the reform. The paper concludes by suggesting features that a reform-leading organization should have in the next administration.
Evaluation and Comparison of Two Government Reforms

1) Presidential Leadership for the Reform
Outcomes of reform heavily depend on the leadership. No matter how much effort civil servants invest, reform will not be successful without a political leader to support it. Unless the President shows keen interest in a reform agenda and thoroughly monitors the process, government reform will never be successful. Accordingly, the leadership of the President can be evaluated by the following three criteria.
4 First, the President should stress the importance of reform and deal with the resistance and problems that occur in the course of reform with a firm and consistent attitude. Usually, important stakeholders such as line ministries and labor unions try to measure the President's determination for reform and control their degree of resistance accordingly. For instance, ministries did not show much resistance against government in 1998 when former President Kim Dae-Jung stated that, "Rough-and-ready reform is acceptable, as long as it is innovative and necessary." However, in early 1999 when President Kim said with a clearly different tone that "Make the process of reform prudent", ministries suddenly raised their voice and strongly opposed government restructuring.
On the other hand, e-government projects that initiated in 2001, two years before the end of President Kim's term, have accomplished significant achievements due to his strong support for the projects. The President Kim had the e-government process reported bi-weekly so that the project could be well regulated and set for success. reform-minded heads had to step down, and those who were considered to be less innovative were promoted as ministers or vice-ministers. For instance, at the end of 1998, the Planning and Budget Commission evaluated the reform-mindedness of the CEOs of state-owned enterprises in order to report the result to the President. The three names at the bottom of the rankings were all considered to be the least cooperative with the reform drive by the government. However, the result was not utilized by the President Kim and was, in actuality, used in a very opposite way. Several months after the evaluation, the least reformative three were promoted to positions as a Minister, Vice-Minister, and congressman. In this respect, President Kim did not take candidates' reform-mindedness into account when he selected his political appointees.
However, to a significant extent, President Roh in his choice of political appointees has reflected the reform accomplishments his candidates previously made. Former Minister Oh Young-Gyo is a typical example. As the CEO of Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency, he reinvented his agency to set role model of a balanced scorecard system and also of public sector reform. He later became the special advisor to the President on Government Innovation was appointed to be the Minister of MOGAHA.
The President also needs to shape favorable political conditions to promote government reform. A key precondition is public support to fight against resistance from stakeholders.
Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi showed his leadership in this way when privatizing the postal service. The Kim administration started to lose public support on government reform after series of corruptive cases by his staffs and families. Another important political condition is a sense of crisis. The Kim administration in 1999 hastily announced a complete recovery from the economic crisis with the early redemption of the IMF bail-out loan. While this announcement heightened the national pride of Korean people, public support for reform decreased significantly afterwards.
The Roh administration has not been successful either in forming favorable conditions for 6 reform. President Roh has failed to gain support from citizens, opposition parties, the press, and public servants. Though he is not solely accountable for his very low approval rating, he fails to form favorable conditions for reform as a leader of a country.
President Roh is most vexed by the lukewarm support from Korea's civil servants though he took measures to boost the morale of the public sector. The current observation indicates that the civil servants are not very happy. The civil servants appeared to have been burnt out by the reform drive of Roh government. Many of them complained about voluminous amounts of paperwork and an excess of meetings provoked by the reform drive.
Additionally, the civil servants feel that President Roh does not trust them. President Roh was somewhat inconsistent in his attitude towards civil servants, sometimes mixing messages of distrust interspersed with assurance of his trust.
Another reason behind the unhappiness of civil servants was the government's incapability of solving public conflicts. Though the participation of stakeholders in policy formulation was very much emphasized by the Participatory Government, a nickname for the Roh government, the public sector was not prepared to handle the flow of resistance. This gap made it very difficult for government officials to formulate and implement their policies. There are five conditions for a successful reform leading organization needs to meet: fulltime and permanent organization, direct empowerment by the President, clear focus on reform, flexibility in organizational management, and a mix of career civil servants and specialists from the private sector. This will be explained in detail in final chapter.
In this respect, the PCGID has had many problems. The Committee will be most b) Gross reduction (-48 thousand) is less than "total net reduction" (total -79 thousand: -22.4 thousand from the central government and -56.6 thousand from local governments) due to increases in number to meet greater demands in administrative needs for teachers, security employees, firefighters, and welfare workers. The Roh government has put more emphasis on better performance of the public sector than on small government. Reform goals such as privatization, employment reduction, and budget cuts are no longer pursued. As a result, the size of the public sector grew rapidly during Roh administration. In principle, a better performance is more important than a higher efficiency, since the former is output whereas the latter is input measure. However, when the expansion of the public sector fails to produce correspondingly better results, we lose both cost minimization and output maximization. One of the main reform directions of the Roh government has been decentralization. This is a reform that can be a foundation for further innovation. Decentralization does not only mean local devolution, but also the handover of budget allocation and personnel management functions concentrated in central agencies such as the MPB and MOGAHA to line ministries.
The decentralization is a very appropriate reform direction that should be much pursued before his term ends.
4) Preparation for Reforms Made In Advance
Before the inauguration, the administration must have a certain blueprint of the reform in mind. A new government usually has strong support from the public making it a suitable time to pursue important and difficult reform agendas. A new government should not waste this golden period for reform.
The blueprints must contain specific strategies and priorities, and not just a list of things to do. The Kim administration's first plan of government reform was the "Top 100 National
Agendas" written in 1998 by the Transition Committee for the Presidency. The Committee, full of enthusiasm at the time, listed numerous things to do and envisioned that all that was 12 left was to simply put the ideas into practice. However, there were neither strategies nor priorities in the list. A notable mistake that came from the lack of the plan was the reform of the governance system of government-funded research institutes, the first big government reform project of the Kim administration. However, reforming government-funded research institutes was neither important nor imminent. This wrong choice of reform agenda comes from the lack of the reform plan.
The reform plan must also be shared and used within the government. In April of 1998, the government announced its master plan for government reform. However, it was merely an event prepared for a press conference, as it has never been used as a reference ever since it was announced.
Since reform must be continued by the next administration, the reform plan should answer One flaw of Roh's roadmaps is that it took over six months to draft them, missing the best period to put them into practice. The government claimed that it would prepare the roadmap and attempt to implement the plans throughout the 5 year term. However, this initial delay in government reform eventually led to a decline in citizens' trust for the government.
Innovation must show early success, nourishing energy for further reform. The skeleton of the roadmaps should have been prepared before coming into office, and the finalization of the roadmaps and implementation of them should have proceeded together. Timing is very important issue for the success of the reform.
5) The Capability to Overcome Resistance
Since government reform will entail resistance, the way the government overcomes it becomes a major factor in determining its success. The government needs to understand the interests of stakeholders and try to reflect them through negotiation. The government must improve its conflict management capacity. The government also needs to be flexible since it is easy to become disoriented and blinded by immediate achievements rather than the ultimate goal of the reform.
Giving credit to an organization suffering harsh restructuring is one way of managing As such, it intensified the resistance from the MOCT. Even if the task was actually driven by the MPB, the credit for the innovation should have been directed towards line ministries.
The Roh government emphasized spontaneous reform and tried to avoid reform agenda that generate strong resistance. However, not all reforms can be accomplished by voluntary participation of stakeholders. Reforms such as privatization, downsizing and integration should be driven non-voluntarily. Though these two methods of reforms should be pursued in a balanced way, the Roh administration skewed too much to the spontaneous reform.
6) Periodical Examinations and Evaluation
To maximize its effect, reform should be examined and evaluated regularly. However, all reform projects initiated under President Kim had neither a specific performance goal nor a target. For example, when reforming government-funded research institutes, we should have included goals and objectives with a specific target. The background of the reform was that the research outcomes were not independent from the umbrella ministries and that they were not fully utilized. However, the means in judging how much independence the institutes gained and to what degree research output was utilized under the new system were not verified.
Secondly, interim evaluations must be made periodically to see whether or not the task is on the right track. In the course of implementation, there can be many unintended effects, and a reformer needs to hand those troubles. Even after a project is finished, the evaluation on the 15 process and outcome of the reform must be made so that mistakes should not be repeated in the future. Self-evaluating reports and requests for external examination after the reform must be secured as a necessary part of the reform procedure. Coordination is trying to tackle this issue, the result of their efforts has yet to be realized.
Each line ministry needs to spend more time developing a viable performance index. An incentive system can also motivate voluntary changes in each ministry. This also requires improvements in the personnel and compensation scheme for government officials.
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However, the methods of compensation are still very limited for lower ranking officials.
Currently, the payment system of the government is mostly based on ranking rather than on performance. More fundamental and systematic changes in the payment matrix should be considered.
Finally, education and training is another important means to stabilize the effects of reform. Meaningful education opportunities for division-directors or above are very much limited. In any organization, resistance against a change generally comes from the middle management level such as division-directors or director-generals. Therefore, education and training for those positions are very important in the reform drive. Recognizing this, the Roh administration has emphasized the importance of training, and has expanded resources significantly compared to those of the Kim government.
8) Overall comparison
This section compares the seven success factors in government reform between the current and previous presidency. The Roh administration is doing a better job than the Kim administration in the areas of preparation for reforms, periodic examinations and evaluation, and change management. However, President Roh shows relative weakness in the areas of the ability of reform-leading organizations, reform direction and overcoming resistance. In terms of Presidential leadership, the two governments are on the par with each other.
For Presidential leadership, though President Roh shows a great deal of interest in government reform, he fails to form favorable political support for reform from major players such as citizens, news media, and Congress.
For reform leading organization, the Planning and Budget Commission of the Kim administration had all five conditions of a good reform-leading organization, thus looks like the best form of government reform body.
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As for reform direction, the Kim administration emphasized a small government, an appropriate choice during the post-economic crisis era. The small government was a widely shared as a reform direction among the public. The Roh administration, however, rightly emphasized the performance of the public sector and decentralization, but neglected the value of small government.
As for preparation for reform, President Roh's Roadmaps made during the first 6 months of the administration made the orientation of his government reform clearer. The Kim administration, however, was not prepared and did not even realize that such roadmaps were necessary.
As for overcoming resistance, President Roh opened the door for conflicts by facilitating the participation of stakeholders without a capacity to manage it properly. For President Kim, the economic crisis created a very good environment in tackling resistance. In a way, it may not be fair to compare the two governments one-to-one since their situations differ. However, it should be noted that President Roh intentionally tried to avoid reforms that could create strong resistance.
Evaluation is another strong point of the Roh government. The Kim administration, on the other hand, did not value the importance of reform evaluation.
Finally, change management includes three aspects: legislation, incentive schemes, and training. The Roh government knew the importance of change management and tried to strengthen the incentive scheme and training system. During President Kim, however, the change management was almost neglected.
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< Table 5 
Suggestions for a Reform Leading Organization
As discussed, the Roh government shows the worst marks on reform-leading organization.
This chapter suggests ideal forms of a reform-leading organization.
1) The Hierarchical Status
The organization must be placed directly under the President since government reform cannot succeed without the attention and support of the President. Reform drives by a leading organization always entail conflicts with line ministries. Therefore, such organizations must symbolically be above other line Ministries. President Kim changed the Planning and Budget
Commission (PBC) under President into the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) under
the Prime Minister's Office in May of 1999. After this change, the reform drive was greatly weakened.
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Another reason why the reform leader should be placed directly under the President is to broaden the coverage of the reform. When the MPB or MOGAHA leads a reform, they may be reluctant to a reform that is against their own interest. It was not a coincidence that a fiscal reform was relatively slow during the Kim administration when the MPB, a budget ministry was leading the government reform.
Second, the organization must be permanent. Every government has had a different Third, the reform-leading organization must specialize in reform. Some people believe that a reformer organization should hold powerful leverages like budget-drafting or personnel management to cope with potential resistance from line ministries. In fact, the MPB has budget formulation authority, and the MOGAHA holds the power to approve organizational change in line ministries. The problem is that those "powerful" leverage functions entail significant amounts of day-to-day business. When those roles coexist with government reform, the head of an organization tends to focus less on the reform agenda because it is generally less imminent. 2) Internal Organization A reform-leading organization must have a flexible organizational structure. Since minor projects cannot create a significant impact, it is better to tackle a huge task to draw the concern of the public and the President. In order to tackle such a huge project, several teams need to work together, and in this respect, teams should not have pre-determined specific responsibilities. In a way, the reform-leading body must not be a settled farmer that performs its pre-set tasks each season, but a flexible hunter organization that goes searching for tasks.
To assist the duties of the Commission, a Secretariat will need approximately six teams with each group covering a set of line ministries. The following is one example of the division of labor. Each team shall be responsible for the reform of the ministries they are to cover.
• To support the head of the Secretariat, three officials should be appointed at directorgeneral levels, with each covering administration and personnel reform, fiscal reform and local empowerment, e-government and reform evaluation. These officials should function as staff assisting the head of the Secretariat for government reform depending on their specialty.
Each official should not have teams under its direct supervision, but should be able to utilize all six teams. This is a matrix structure with a division of labor both by function and by object. It has several merits. First, large-scale projects that cannot be handled by one team can be easily managed since each team has no functional barrier. Second, since each team will search for reform tasks in the ministries in which they are in charge of, all line ministries can have a sense of constructive oversight at all times.
Certain shortcomings do exist in this matrix structure, but most can be overcome. First, the three officials will have to compete with one another to secure the time inputs of the six teams.
Coordination is therefore a job of the head of the Secretariat. Secondly, since the six teams 23 must be responsible for all reform agendas of the Ministries, each team will have a better understanding on each Ministry. However, a functional specialty for instance on personnel matters or e-government could be weak. This issue boils down to a matter of choice between functional specialty and object or ministry specialty. Comprehension on each ministry is harder to come by as it evolves from internal information and experience. In my view, this kind of institutional knowledge is more important in formulating a reform strategy appropriate for each ministry. Also the three director-generals can supplement the lack of field specialty. is one background to a decline and stagnation in the reform process. Contract-based officials from non-government sector tend to be more accomplishment-oriented. However, they lack in institutional knowledge on the government. Hybridization of the organization is a very powerful way to maintain its reform capacity.
What would be the optimal composition of human resources in the Commission? The
Chairperson of the Commission must be someone the President deeply trusts. Being a position that can easily generate enemies and criticism, a lack of trust from the President is likely to weaken the reform drive. The head of the Secretariat can be either a career civil servant or a political appointee. In the case of the PCGID, the head of the Secretariat also serves as an advisor to the President. But when the Commission becomes a permanent entity, this would not be necessary. The three director-generals should be experts from the non-government sector. The success of the matrix structure depends on the outgoing search of those officials for tasks to be done. As for the head of each team, a fifty-fifty mix of experts from the nongovernment sector and career civil servants would be ideal. However the team members could be chosen mostly from career civil servants. A right driving force is the key to success in government reform. It is my hope that the next government can start with this key.
